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To FEE OR NOT TO FEE: ALFONSO v. DIAMONDHEAD
FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT AND MississiPi'S NEED
FOR A FEE-TAx DELINEATION
Andrew R. Norwood*
I. INTRODUCTION
Taxes are not always easy to identify. During the Constitutional Con-
vention when the legislature questioned the difference between a direct tax
and an indirect tax, James Madison noted: "No one answd."1 With the in-
creasing use of fees-as a means of raising public revenues-taxes are now
even harder to identify. Fees, in many ways, are similar to taxes but they
possess crucial differences. And because fees are not restricted in the same
manner as taxes, they are often the perfect vehicle for governments to use
as a back door for funding public projects.
Fees have received a lot of attention over the past ten years, and many
courts have been forced to address their special characteristics because of
their increased use.2 Mississippi courts have dealt with fees on a few occa-
sions, although these holdings have mainly been limited to impact fees-as
opposed to the more commonly implemented user fees. In this Note, the
primary focus will be user fees and the case law and statutes surrounding
them. User fees were most recently addressed by the Mississippi Supreme
Court in Alfonso v. Diamondhead Fire Protection District? This specific
type of fee is growing rapidly because of its usefulness to districts and local
governments. The term "district" in this Note will be used as a reference
for fire protection, water, sewer, and garbage collection and disposal dis-
tricts mentioned in Mississippi Code section 19-5-151. Although this Note
will deal mostly with the fees imposed by these districts, the application of
the same principles can be applied to a wider array of public entities.
The Court's decision in Alfonso is potentially problematic, not simply
because of its holding but, more importantly, because of the process used
to reach its conclusion. The Court had an opportunity to examine a fee and
provide a definitive approach for distinguishing a fee from a tax. Such an
approach is needed to accurately categorize public charges so that the
proper restrictions can be imposed. But the Court delayed providing the
much-needed guidance, and resolved the case by examining the language
* J.D. Candidate, Mississippi College School of Law, 2015. To my wife Kim: thank you for
your love and support. To Professor Larry Lee: thank you for your guidance and thoughtful review of
this Note; your help throughout the writing process, in addition to your tax expertise, made all the
difference. And to the members of the Mississippi College Law Review: thank you for all the tiresome
work that went in to preparing this Note for publication.
1. James Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, available at http://www.constitu-
tion.org/dfc/dfc-1787.txt (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
2. David Segal, Cities Turn to Fees to Fill Budget Gaps, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2009, at Al.
3. Alfonso v. Diamondhead Fire Prot. Dist., 122 So. 3d 54, 55 (Miss. 2013).
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of the statute and defining "services rendered." By doing so, the Court
evaded a difficult issue, but it might have also provided districts with a
dangerous power to be wielded against the individuals in its area.
My intention with this Note is first to display the historical treatment
that Mississippi courts, specifically the Mississippi Supreme Court, have
given to fees, and how that treatment coincides with the new holding in
Alfonso. After considering the development of Mississippi's law in this
area, I will examine the importance of distinguishing fees from taxes in a
systematic and consistent manner; the consequences of failing to do so; the
approaches taken by other States; and finally, possible solutions for Missis-
sippi's potential problems.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Diamondhead Fire Protection District ("DFPD") began in 19744
as a volunteer fire department that served the needs of a specific district in
Diamondhead, Mississippi. Originally, the DFPD was funded by ad
valorem taxes and donations from the community.5 All was well until 1993
when the benevolence of the property owners ran dry and donations came
to a halt.6 The DFPD was left at a pivotal juncture. From what source
would the new funding come? Their answer: a monthly charge.7 In order
to fund the fire department, all property owners in Diamondhead were as-
sessed fifteen dollars per month.8 The DFPD felt no initial resistance, so it
continued in this manner.9 In 2002, the DFPD increased their monthly as-
sessment o twenty dollars per month.'0
Today, the fire department boasts fifteen full-time fire fighters, with
four on duty at all times.1' In addition to responding to approximately 700
emergency calls a year, it also provides post-fire investigations, pre-incident
plans, safety education training, and various fire related inspections.12 In
recognition of this work, the DFPD has obtained a "Class Six" fire rating.3
4. Not until 1976 did the DFPD become a full-time, paid department. Diamondhead Fire De-
partment, http://dhfire.tripod.com/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
5. More specifically, the DFPD was funded through property taxes assessed by the municipality
on real property and through donations. The Diamondhead Country Club and Property Owner's Asso-
ciation made donations to the DFPD. Generally, ad valorem taxes make up a significant portion of the
revenue for state and local governments. Diamondhead Fire Department, http://dhfire.tripod.com/
(last visited Apr. 2, 2015).







13. The Mississippi Insurance Rating Bureau provides a rating for each fire department. The
ratings range from Class One, as the best rating possible, to a Class Ten, as the worst. Insurance compa-
nies usually base their premiums on the area's fire rating. Considerations for the ratings include: "[t]he
fire department, the water department, the fire alarm system, the fire prevention program, the building
department[,] and permit's department." Mississippi State Rating Bureau, http://www.msratingbureau
.com/minimum-requirements.old.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2015). For comparison, the best fire ratings
attained in Mississippi to date is a Class Three.
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All in all, the DFPD is a proficient fire department, capable of meeting the
needs of the citizens in its district.
Even so, in March of 2009, property owners in the DFPD decided that
they were tired of the monthly charge. They sued the DFPD, along with
several members-past and present-on the board of commissioners, for
the mandatory monthly assessment.14 The property owners urged the Han-
cock County Circuit Court for a declaratory judgment to render the
monthly charge void as an illegal tax.
15
Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 57, the trial court
found that a declaratory judgment was appropriate.16 The court opined
that the monthly charge is a permissible fee, rather than a tax, according to
Mississippi Code section 19-5-195.17 The trial court focused on the non-
restrictive language of Mississippi Code section 19-5-195 as permitting a
broad reading of the term "fees."' 8 The court further distinguished the
DFPD's monthly charge from a tax by citing Mayor and Board of Alder-
man, City of Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders Association of Mississippi, Inc.
for the proposition that taxes are generally imposed by a state or municipal
legislature as opposed to a fee, which is imposed by an agency on those it
regulates.19
After the trial court denied the property owner's motion to reconsider,
they filed an appeal, which the Mississippi Supreme Court accepted.2 °
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
"The beginning of wisdom is to call things by their proper name."
2'
And if Confucius is correct, it can be said that wisdom is needed to sort
through fees and taxes. Fees are often improperly named, which tends to
blur an already hazy subject. The problem often stems from a failure to
artfully use these terms. This naming issue is not specific to Mississippi; it
is perplexing in the vast majority of jurisdictions.22 Development of the
14. Alfonso, 122 So. 3d at 54. The complaint also alleged several counts of negligence, inten-
tional assessment, and extortion.
15. Alfonso v. Diamondhead Fire Prot. Dist., No. 09-00145, at $ 2 (Miss. Hancock Cnty. Ct. Feb.
17, 2011). Plaintiffs' complaint also demanded actual and punitive damages for past assessments, a
figure that the Plaintiffs' claimed was approximately ten million dollars.
16. Id. at 1 1.
17. Id. at 1 6.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Id. at 1 6.
20. The appeal was granted to resolve two issues: (1) "whether the monthly fee is an illegal
tax[,]" and (2) "whether the power to tax should be construed narrowly." Alfonso, 122 So. 3d at 54.
21. Confucius > Quotes > Quotable Quote, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/106313-the-begin-
ning-of-wisdom-is-to-call-things-by-their (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
22. The problem is evident from the literature written on other state's treatment of fees and
taxes, such as: Hugh Spitzer, Comment, Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious Confusion, 38 GONZ. L. REv. 335
(2003); Mark Wolowitz ed., Washington Municipal Ambulance Utility Fee Held to be an Illegal Tax,
JOURNAL OF MULTISTATE TAXATION AND INCENTIVES, Sept. 2004; David Pettinari, Michigan's Com-
mon Law Distinction Between Taxes and Regulatory Fees, User Fees and Special Assessments, JOURNAL
OF MULTISTATE TAXATION AND INCENTIVES, Aug. 2000, at *26-35; Laurie Reynolds, Comment, Taxes,
Fees, Assessments, Dues and the "Get What You Pay For" Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. Riv.
373 (2004).
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Mississippi law in this area is not necessarily behind all other states (there
is a widespread need for clarification of the distinction between fees and
taxes) but it is a far cry from where it could be.
Distinguishing fees from taxes is not an easy endeavor. Even in juris-
dictions that have well equipped themselves to segregate the two, the re-
sults sometimes seem as though a coin was flipped to decide the matter.
But as municipal corporations and districts seek new ways to expand their
revenue-gathering powers, fees have become a productive alternative that
requires additional consideration-particularly in a poor state such as
Mississippi.
A. Early Cases
Mississippi's first case with a fee-tax issue, while only incidental, was in
1883 in Murray v. Lehman.2 3 There the court addressed a docket fee im-
posed by a circuit court on its litigants.2 4 These docket fees were used to
supplement the salary of the judge and chancellor of that particular court."
The Court in Murray plainly stated that this "docket fee" was no fee at
all-it was a tax. 6 The Court, however, did not consider this error worthy
of correction, but instead merely made the comment in passing.27 The
name or label of the charge did not make a difference, yet the fact that it
was actually a tax changed the reasoning, and ultimate outcome, of the
case.2" By applying tax principles, the Court found that the docket fee did
not meet the requirements of equality and uniformity, and hence, was
unconstitutional.Z9
The Court's analysis in Murray implicitly recognized that there was an
important distinction between fees and taxes. Certain restrictions apply to
taxes that are not imposed on fees, and for that reason, it was important for
the Court to distinguish the docket fee as a disguised tax.
Nevertheless, several decades later the Mississippi Supreme Court
treated fees and taxes as though there was no difference between the two.
30
In Pryor v. State, the plaintiff sued to contest the validity of a "privilege
license tax."31 The Court used the term "fee" and "tax" interchangeably,
at times alternating them within a single sentence to refer to the same
charge.32 More specifically, the Court stated that the privilege tax was ad-
ministered through a "license fee.,33 As a result, the Court held that a fee
23. Murray v. Lehman, 61 Miss. 283 (Miss. 1883).
24. Id. at 283-84.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 286 ("The docket fee required by the act under consideration is a tax . .
27. Id.
28. Id. at 286-87.
29. Id. at 287.
30. Pryor v. State, 139 So. 850, 851 (Miss. 1932).
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was used to carry out a tax.34 A similar treatment is found in City of Gre-
nada v. Andrews.35 Again, fees and taxes are treated as one and the same.
No distinction is made between a privilege tax and a license fee; rather, a
license fee is held to be the method used to carry out a privilege tax.36 In
fact, the charge was called a "privilege tax fee."'37 To further the amalga-
mation, Snapp v. Neal in the same vein classified a "fee for house trailers"
as a tax.38 This was the result of a statute, since repealed, that stated, "the
term 'taxation' shall include but not be limited to licenses, fees, or excises
imposed in respect to motor vehicles or the use thereof."39
In early cases before the Mississippi Supreme Court, the lack of clarity
between fees and taxes was generally immaterial as the need for distinction
was not as prevalent as today. That being said, when delineation was abso-
lutely necessary-such as Murray v. Lehman-an implied difference satis-
fied the court. Because fees and taxes were (and are) often used
interchangeably, it is difficult to ferret out the distinction the Court has
made over the years. But it is clear that the differences are often
overlooked.
B. Later Cases
In the past twenty years, the Mississippi Supreme Court has provided
an in depth analysis of fees in only a handful of cases, with the type of fee
differing from case to case. Although fees come in all shapes and sizes, the
cases before the Mississippi Supreme Court have mostly involved regula-
tory fees and user fees. Alfonso presented the Court with a user fee. For
analysis and to avoid confusion, these different fee types will be dealt with
separately.
1. Regulatory Fees
Regulatory fees stem from "the government's police powers and are
imposed on a regulated individual, entity, property, or business in order to
offset the cost of the regulation."40 The regulatory fee that has sparked
much of the fee-tax discussion in Mississippi is impact fees. An impact fee
is "a monetary charge imposed by a county or municipal government.., to
regulate new development on real property."4 1 This type of fee attempts to
offset the cost that comes from new development or growth.4 2
Generally, states grant local governments and districts the authority to
implement impact fees in two ways: (1) expressly by enacting impact fee
34. Id.
35. City of Grenada v. Andrews, 58 So. 2d 382 (Miss. 1952).
36. Id. at 383-84.
37. Id. at 382.
38. Snapp v. Neal, 164 So. 2d 752, 758 (Miss. 1964).
39. Id. at 756.
40. Reynolds, supra note 22, at 407.
41. Mayor & Bd. of Alderman, City of Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders Ass'n of Miss. Inc., 932
So. 2d 44, 51 (Miss. 2006) (quoting TENN. Corn. ANN. § 66-5-211(b)(3)).
42. James Kushner, SUBDIVISION LAW & Gitowri MGMT § 6.31 (2d ed. 2013).
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enabling legislation; or (2) implicitly through the home rule and a local
government's broad police power.43 The majority of states have authorized
impact fees by enacting statutes, which equip local governments with such
power.4 4 Mississippi does not yet find itself in that category, however, as it
has not passed impact fee legislation.
In 1993, the Mississippi Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Sweet Home Water & Sewer Association v. Lexington Estates, Ltd..45 In
that case, a public utility imposed an impact fee on a construction company
that was in the process of developing a new apartment complex.46 Interest-
ingly, Sweet Home Water had not assessed an impact fee to anyone before
this time and it did not assess anyone else after.47 When Lexington Estates
refused to pay the impact fee, Sweet Home Water & Sewer shut off its
water and sewer service, which resulted in Lexington Estates filing the
lawsuit.48
The Court in Sweet Home first considered Sweet Home's power to
exact an impact fee.49 A district is permitted to obtain revenue from "rea-
sonable rates, fees, tolls or charges for the services, facilities and commodi-
ties of its system .... ,50 The Court noted, however, that those fees "must
be reasonably calculated to provide for the system's functioning and
growth. '51 Sweet Home's impact fee was not considered a necessary ex-
pense to the system's functioning and growth.52 Further, Sweet Home
could only claim that the charge was administered out of a "fear" that Lex-
ington Estates would have a negative impact on the system.53 The charge
was not tied to any legitimate service or administrative expense that Sweet
Home had or would provide; consequently, the Court held that the district
did not have the authority to charge the impact fee.54
The Court in Sweet Home recognized that a district's authority to
charge for its services should be carefully scrutinized.55 The Court ex-
amined the statute granting a district the authority to raise revenue and its
analysis flowed directly from that statute.56 Instead of interpreting the stat-
ute broadly, the Court's analysis made it clear that Mississippi Code section
43. Kenneth Farmer, Comment, Impact Fees: An Alternative Way to Finance Public Facilities in
Mississippi, 28 Miss. C. L. REv. 287, 291-92 (2009).
44. As of 2006, twenty-seven states have adopted impact fee legislation. Four more states have
authorized them in some way other than statutorily. Mayor & Bd. of Alderman, 932 So. 2d at 51.
45. Sweet Home Water & Sewer Ass'n v. Lexington Estates, Ltd., 613 So. 2d 864 (Miss. 1993).
46. Id. at 866.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 868.
49. Id. at 869.
50. Miss. Coot' ANN. § 19-5-195 (West 2014).
51. Sweet Home Water & Sewer Ass'n, 613 So. 2d at 870.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 871.
55. Id. at 870.
56. Id.
[VOL. 34:63
TO FEE OR NOT TO FEE
19-5-177 and similar provisions were to be strictly and narrowly
construed.57
The issue of impact fees arose once again in Mayor & Board of Alder-
man v. Homebuilders Association of Mississippi, Inc.58 In that case, the
Homebuilders Association of Mississippi challenged an impact fee ordi-
nance adopted by the City of Ocean Springs.59 Ocean Springs adopted the
new impact fee ordinance as a part of a Comprehensive Plan for the city's
growth and development.6" The Court seemed to pursue a more methodi-
cal approach than was seen in Sweet Home. First, it considered the City's
authority to impose an impact fee.6 1 The Court recognized two different
sources that provide a district the right to impose an impact fee: one is an
impact fee statute and the other is the City's police power.62 Because Mis-
sissippi has not adopted impact fee legislation, the Court spent most of its
time pondering the city's police power.63
Ocean Springs argued that the Home Rule statute provides it with the
authority to impose impact fees.64 But after considering the applicable
statutes, the Court found that neither the Home Rule statute nor any other
municipal planning statute, gives "no express grant of authority" for a City
to impose impact fees.6 5 Again, the Mississippi Supreme Court tethered a
local government's use of fees to a specific grant of authority by the legisla-
ture. Extending a strict and narrow construction, the Court seemed to be
extremely hesitant, if not averse, to implying a district's authority to impose
fees.
Although Sweet Home and Ocean Springs share a similar approach to
deciding a district's authority to charge fees, there is one important differ-
ence. While Sweet Home states that a district can impose an impact fee
that is reasonable, Ocean Springs does not allow for such a condition. This
difference is easily clarified, however, by noting and focusing on the parties
who imposed the fees. In Ocean Springs, the City of Ocean Springs was
attempting to impose an impact fee, whereas in Sweet Home, a water and
sewer district was administering the fee. A district is expressly granted the
power to charge fees for services rendered, whereas a City is given no such
express authority. So these holdings are not inconsistent with one another
but rather a similar approach applied to different entities.
66
57. Id.
58. Mayor & Bd. of Alderman, City of Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders Ass'n of Miss. Inc., 932
So. 2d 44, 51 (Miss. 2006) (quoting TENN. CoiD ANN. § 66-5-211(b)(3)).
59. Id. at 47.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 50.
62. Id. at 51.
63. Id. at 52.
64. The Home Rule is found at Miss. Coio: ANN. § 21-17-5.
65. Mayor & Bd. of Alderman, 932 So. 2d at 53.
66. Some have noted that the Ocean Springs case stands for a new approach to impact fees and a
harsher treatment of them. But I do not see this as being the case. I think the Mississippi Supreme
Court was dealing with different parties, different statutes, and different grants of authority. Kenneth
Farmer, Impact Fees: An Alternative Way to Finance Public Facilities in Mississippi, 28 Miss. C. L. REV.
287, 304 (2009).
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These cases offer insight into the Mississippi Supreme Court's treat-
ment of fees administered on a local level. Although regulatory fees differ
from user fees, the Court's analysis reveals that a local government or dis-
trict's authority to charge fees for services is to be strictly and narrowly
construed. I began by examining regulatory fees because the law is more
developed than it is for user fees, and hence, it offers more insight into how
Mississippi treats fees in general.
2. User Fees
A user fee is a charge "levied by the government in exchange for citi-
zen use of government services or property."67 Mississippi does not pos-
sess a wealth of case law on this subject. But the Mississippi Supreme
Court did examine a user fee in Rogers v. Oktibbeha County Board of Su-
pervisors.68 Preceding the Rogers case, Oktibbeha County had started a
garbage collection district and regularly assessed a monthly fee of $9.75 to
all residents within the district.6 9 Two of the residents did not use or need
the service because they disposed of the little garbage they produced on
their own land.7 0 Despite never using the service, Oktibbeha County sued
to collect their "delinquent" fees.7 '
The Court's treatment of user fees differs from that shown in the im-
pact fee cases. The Court seems to rush to several successive conclusions
without extensive analysis. For instance, the property owners that refused
to pay the fee were quickly labeled "garbage generators.' 72 How did the
Court reach this conclusion? By pointing to the defendant's admissions
that they did in fact produce garbage on a regular basis.7 3 It also stated
that they disposed of their garbage themselves, without leaving anything
for the County to collect; but their self-disposal was not considered.7 ' The
Court quickly determined that the defendants were "clearly 'generators of
garbage.' ,
75
More importantly, the Court did not decide the issue of whether the
"garbage collection fee" was a tax.76 The Court found that every person in
the district was required to pay the garbage collection fee, regardless of
use. 77 This holding leaves little room for distinguishing a fee from a tax.
The Court qualifies its view by stating that an opt-out provision is available
for a county to adopt if it so desires.78 Read this way, the Court seems to
promote a "your choice" provision, allowing counties to decide if they wish
67. Reynolds, supra note 22, at 407.
68. Rogers v. Oktibbeha Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 749 So. 2d 966 (Miss. 1999).
69. Id. at 967.
70. Id.
71. Id.




76. Id. at 971 (Cobb, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 968.
78. Id. at 969.
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to tax the residents or charge a fee to those who want to utilize a service. If
a county does not adopt an opt-out provision, the county is essentially as-
sessing a tax to the entire county. I say tax because the assessment is no
longer tied to a benefit received. Rather, it is a mandatory charge based on
a person's status that benefits the community as a whole. These are essen-
tial characteristics of a tax. And as previously mentioned, Oktibbeha
County had not adopted any such opt-out provision.9 Yet the Court still
stated that the defendants should have requested this exception-even if it
didn't exist.
Writing a dissenting opinion in Rogers, Justice Cobb states some of
these flaws.8" He remarked how the majority's opinion muddled the dis-
tinction between fees and taxes, referencing the district's option to tax the
county residents as a funding mechanism if it desired.8" Mississippi Code
section 19-5-21(1) allows the Board of Supervisors to levy an ad valorem
tax rather than a user fee, which would "assure that all county property
owners would pay, regardless of use."'8 2 Although the dissent recognized
that fees and taxes were improperly mixed in the majority opinion, it did
not clarify the proper distinction.
Therefore, we are left with a very unsatisfying result on the fee-tax
distinction. The Court in Rogers does not provide a proper framework for
analyzing a district's use of its authority to charge user fees for the services
it provides, or in the alternative, to recognize a tax in fee clothing. While
these cases do not provide adequate guidance for delineating fees and
taxes, two other areas shed light on the topic: dictum from Ocean Springs
and Attorney General opinions.
3. Dictum in Ocean Springs
The Mississippi Supreme Court offered its most informative opinion
on the fee-tax delineation in Ocean Springs.3 The dictum that the Court
sets forth in that case lays some foundational truths that apply when differ-
entiating fees and taxes. To determine if a regulatory fee was valid or con-
stituted a tax, the Court in Ocean Springs examined some fundamental
characteristics of fees and taxes.84
The Mississippi Supreme Court looks to the United States Supreme
Court for guidance on the distinction between fees and taxes. In Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. City of Decatur, the United States Supreme Court
offered definitions for a tax and a special assessment.85
79. Id. at 970 (Cobb, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 969 (Cobb, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 971 (Cobb, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Cobb, J., dissenting).
83. Mayor & Bd. of Alderman, City of Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders Ass'n of Miss. Inc., 932
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The general levy of taxes is understood to exact contributions in return
for the general benefits of government and it promises nothing to the per-
sons taxed beyond what may be anticipated from an administration of the
laws for individual protection and the general public good. Special Assess-
ments, on the other hand, are made upon the assumption that a portion of
the community is to be especially and peculiarly benefited, in the enhance-
ment of the value of the property peculiarly situated as regards a contem-
plated expenditure of public funds; and, in addition to the general levy,
they demand that special contributions, in consideration of the special ben-
efit, shall be made by the persons receiving it.
86
The Fifth Circuit also addressed the distinguishing marks of fees and
taxes. In Homebuilders Association of Mississippi v. City of Madison, Mis-
sissippi., the Fifth Circuit found "workable distinctions" from case law on
the subject.87 One distinction was that while a tax "sustains the essential
flow of revenue to the government" and benefits the community at large, a
fee "is linked to some regulatory scheme" and raises money only to offset
an "agency's regulatory expenses."88 Moreover, fees are usually "limited
to the proportionate cost of giving the fee payer ... special attention."89
The Court in Ocean Springs rejected the City's authority to implement
an impact fee because the fee was not shown to offset any of the City's
expenses.9" The Court also gave deference to the Iowa Supreme Court for
its decision in Home Builders Association of Greater Des Moines v. City of
West Des Moines.9 There, the Iowa Supreme Court was faced with an
impact fee imposed on residential building permits that was intended to
fund parks in the area. The court held that because the fee was not "com-
pensation for direct service," it was an invalid tax.9 2 The Mississippi Su-
preme Court used that reasoning to sort through the issue it was asked to
decide. The Court concluded by stating that a "county and city are not
authorized to impose taxes without direct authorization from the
Legislature."93
The Court's dictum, as well as past case law, unveils an intent to treat a
municipal corporation or district's revenue raising mechanisms as either:
(1) a fee, which must be tied to a direct service; or (2) a tax, which must be
tied to a direct grant of authority by legislature. This treatment is more
clearly seen through the Court's opinions on regulatory/impact fees. User
fees, on the other hand, have not benefited from any type of similar legal
analysis.
86. I1. Cent. R.R. Co. v. City of Decatur, 147 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1893).
87. Homebuilders Ass'n of Miss. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir. 1998).
88. Id. at 1011.
89. Mayor & Bd. of Alderman, City of Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders Ass'n of Miss. Inc., 932
So. 2d at 55 (Miss. 2006).
90. Id.
91. Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Des Moines v. City of West Des Moines, 644 N.W.2d 339
(Iowa 2002).
92. id. at 350.
93. Mayor & Bd. of Alderman, 932 So. 2d at 59.
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4. Attorney General Opinions
Another source for defining Mississippi's treatment of fees is Attorney
General ("AG") opinions. While these opinions are not binding, they are
persuasive authority that the Court can, and often does, consult for gui-
dance.94 The AG is charged with responding to any public body or official
who requests his interpretation of a statute.95 The AG must then "give his
opinion in writing ... upon any question of law relating to their respective
offices."96 Over the years, the AG has frequently been asked for his inter-
pretation of statutes dealing with a municipal corporation or district's au-
thority to charge fees. Many of these opinions deal specifically with fire
protection districts, which helps flesh out the issue presented in Alfonso.
In 1990, Sylvia Pross queried the AG to determine if a fire district
could charge fees for providing fire protection services.97 In a brief re-
sponse, the AG announced that he believed that Mississippi Code section
19-5-175 gave a district the power to charge fees "for services rendered.
98
This opinion was followed later with a short clarification of the meaning of
"fire protection services."9 9 The AG stated that while he was not fully able
to give an adequate definition, he opined that making a determination as to
what constitutes "fire protections services" is largely a question of fact.100
He went on to state that a reasonable conclusion would be to find that fire
services are those "related to fires and fire fighting, including emergency
response and rescue services."' '
The AG also addressed impact fees and the Court's interpretation of
them in light of Ocean Springs.1" 2 The AG stated that although Ocean
Springs applied to a municipal corporation, as opposed to a district, Missis-
sippi law requires a specific grant of authority to impose impact fees. After
reciting and considering Mississippi Code section 19-5-195,"3 the AG
opined that impact fees are not included in the district's arsenal."m If the
statute does not grant such authority, then it is outside of the district's
power to charge impact fees. This holding reiterates the Court's narrow
interpretation of the statutes and its reluctance to grant power to a district
that the legislature has not expressly given.
The AG's opinion offered to the Honorable Randy Wilburn directly
addressed a fire district's use of fees.1"5 A fire district, which was funded at
the time by a portion of ad valorem taxes, wanted to charge dues to its
residents to help fund its services. After consideration, the AG declared
94. Poppenheimer v. Estate of Coyle, 98 So. 3d 1059, 1066 (Miss. 2012).
95. Miss. Comi, ANN. § 7-5-25.
96. Id.
97. Sylvia Pross, Op. Att'y Gen., 1990 WL 548177 (Miss. Nov. 29, 1990).
98. Id.
99. Phillip Terney, Op. Att'y Gen., 1998 WL 958140 (Miss. Dec. 11, 1998).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Larry Norris, Op. Att'y Gen., 2007 WL 1229246 (Miss. Mar. 20, 2007).
103. Id. This is the same statute that grants a fire protection district with the power to charge fees.
104. Id.
105. Randy Wilburn, Op. Att'y Gen., 2000 WL 1207464 (Miss. July 14, 2000).
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that "charging 'dues' for fire protection services constitutes a tax that is not
authorized by statute and is therefore prohibited.1 ° 6 The Mississippi Su-
preme Court reached a different conclusion in Alfonso in what appears to
be the same scenario.
Further, the AG later qualified his opinion to Wilburn in an opinion to
Charles Marshall.1"7 Again, a fire department that was funded largely
through ad valorem taxes and donations desired the AG's approval to be-
gin charging mandatory fees to all residents in its district.'018 The AG an-
swered by urging the fire district to take notice of the limits on its
authority. While a fire district may charge fees for "services which have
already been rendered," it may not "levy rates and charges in anticipation
of rendering services.' 109 Charging fees for anticipatory services, he
claimed, would amount to an unlawful tax. 110
The opinions of the AG offer pointed insight into the issue of a dis-
trict's authority to charge fees. The boundaries between fees and taxes are
most clearly delineated in the AG opinions. Although these opinions are
not binding on the courts, they represent the treatment that will likely be
given the certain statutes. That notwithstanding, as seen in Alfonso, AG
opinions are not always followed or even addressed by the courts.
IV. INSTANT CASE
A. Majority Opinion
In Alfonso v. Diamondhead Fire Protection District, the Mississippi Su-
preme Court answered the question of whether a mandatory monthly fee
imposed by a fire district on property owners constitutes an illegal tax.11
Chief Justice Waller authored the opinion for the majority and was joined
by Justices Randolph, Lamar, and Pierce.
1 12
The majority opinion focused on the meaning of "services rendered"
in Mississippi Code section 19-5-177(1)(e)) 13 As an issue of first impres-
sion, the Court found that meaning to be the crux of the case. Fire protec-
tion districts are authorized to charge for "services rendered by or through
the facilities of such district . . 14 But, the statute does not define "ser-
vices rendered." What is a service and when is it rendered? These are the
questions the Court endeavored to answer in Alfonso.
106. Id.




111. Alfonso v. Diamondhead Fire Prot. Dist., 122 So. 3d 54, 56 (Miss. 2013). Although the ap-
peal raised two issues, the Court consolidated them into one: "whether the DFPD's fee for fire-protec-
tion services is based on services rendered or whether the charge amounts to an illegal tax[.]" Id. at 55-
56.
112. Id. at 56.
113. Id. at 57.
114. Miss CoiE ANN. § 19-5-177(1)(e).
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The majority first reviewed the arguments of the parties. The property
owners contended that the fire district did not provide them any services,
citing the fact that no fires were put out on their residences.1 15 They also
cite opinions of the AG" 6 to bolster their claim that "anticipatory services"
are not included in "services rendered."' 7 So they argued that their
monthly fee was charged for purely anticipatory services and was an illegal
tax. 118
The DFPD argued that daily services to the property owners are re-
quired in order to properly serve them in the event of a fire." 9 It claimed
that activities necessary to prepare for fires and other emergencies are ser-
vices rendered.1"' These activities include: maintaining fire equipment,
staffing the fire station, staffing medical technicians, maintaining pre-inci-
dent plans, inspecting fire hydrants, and providing safety training.12' Be-
cause all these activities were rendered and benefitted the property owners,
the DFPD asserted that it may recover fees in exchange.
After summarizing the stances, the Court looked to a pair of dictiona-
ries to help resolve the matter.122 Black's Law and Webster's Third New
International were consulted for a plain meaning of the term "service. 12
13
Black's Law Dictionary revealed that a "service," among other things, is
"doing something useful for a person .... " 124 And Webster's showed that
"'service" is "the performance of work commanded or paid for by
another .... 25
After quoting the two definitions of "service," the Court discussed the
holdings of other courts that have dealt with similar issues, particularly a
Washington decision and a Wisconsin decision.'26 The Supreme Court of
Washington found that "benefits charges" were permissible because it con-
sidered them to be fees for "benefits received.'2 7 Also, the Wisconsin de-
cision held that the "substance, and not the form, of the imposition is the
test . . 2,,8 Therefore, the court declared the charge to be a fee rather
than a tax.1
29
115. Alfonso, 122 So. 3d at 56.
116. Attorney General opinions are discussed in more depth supra, Part II.
117. Pl. Complaint at 8, Alfonso v. Diamondhead Fire Prot. Dist., No. 09-00145 (Miss. Hancock
Cnty. Ct. Feb. 17, 2011).
118. Id.
119. Alfonso, 122 So. 3d at 56.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 56.
123. The Court is required to give terms in statutes their "common and ordinary acceptation and
meaning." Miss CoDE, ANN. § 1-3-65.
124. Alfonso, 122 So. 3d at 56.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 57.
127. King County Fire Prot. Dist. v. Housing Auth. of King County, 872 P.2d 516, 524 (Wash.
1994).
128. City of River Falls v. St. Bridget's Catholic Church of River Falls, 513 N.W.2d 673, 675-676
(Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
129. Id.
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The majority jumped from a plain meaning of "service," to other
courts' holdings, to reaching its conclusion with little application or transi-
tion. It concluded by stating a simple conclusion: "the DFPD provides a
valuable service .... Therefore, the fee assessed is permissible.'
130
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice King filed a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Kitch-
ens and Chandler, resulting in a 4-3 decision.13 ' The dissent interpreted
"services rendered" narrowly, tying services to direct fees charged for di-
rect services. With this view, the dissent stated that it found the fee to be
an illegal tax.'
32
Justice King considered the three different methods a fire district can
utilize to raise funds.'33 The legislature has provided that a fire district can
use three means of funding: certain types of taxes,134 fees for "services ren-
dered,"135 and revenue bonds.136 With regard to taxing authority, the Leg-
islature is solely vested with the power to tax.'37 The Legislature has, in
turn, granted municipalities the authority to levy special taxes. More spe-
cifically, a county Board of Supervisors may collect a special tax for "fire
protection purposes."'38 The tax is not to exceed four mills 139 annually,
which is the amount that DFPD has received from the municipality.140 The
DFPD utilized this form of revenue to the full extent of the law.14 ' A fire-
protection district may also use revenue bonds as a source of income.4 2
But neither of these methods were disputed in this case. Rather, the prop-
erty owners claimed the invasion came from an unauthorized fee.
The third method, which was the subject of dispute, was the charging
of fees for services rendered. The Legislature authorized fire-protection
districts to charge fees for "services rendered by or through the facilities of
such district .... 143 The property owners did not contest their authority,
but rather limited their argument to the specific definition of "services ren-
dered.' 44 The property owners claimed that a fire-protection district can
130. Alfonso, 122 So. 3d at 57.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 57-59.
134. Miss. CODE ANN. § 19-5-189.
135. Miss. CODIE ANN. § 19-5-177(1)(e).
136. Miss. COE ANN. § 19-5-181.
137. See City of Jackson v. Pittman, 484 So. 2d 998, 999 (Miss. 1986).
138. Miss. CODE ANN. § 19-5-189.
139. A mill is one one-thousandth of a dollar. So where the millage rate is four, the tax would
amount to $4 for every $1,000 in property value. How to Calculate Property Tax Liability, TAX FOUN-
DATION, http://taxfoundation.org/article/how-calculate-property-tax-liability-2 (last visited Apr. 3,
2015).
140. Miss. COE ANN. § 19-5-189.
141. Alfonso v. Diamondhead Fire Prot. Dist., 122 So. 3d 54, 55 (Miss. 2013).
142. Miss. CODE ANN. § 19-5-181.
143. MISS. CODE ANN. § 19-5-177(1)(e).
144. Alfonso, 122 So. 3d at 59.
[VOL, 34:63
TO FEE OR NOT TO FEE
only charge for direct services it provides, i.e., responding to a fire, provid-
ing an inspection, etc.'4 5 The dissent agreed with the property owners.'46
The DFPD argued that it had rendered real services to the property
owners.14' Even though it may not have responded to a fire at a property
owner's house, it was available to respond to an emergency and rendered
services in other ways: maintaining and repairing equipment, staffing the
fire station with firefighters and medical technicians, developing pre-inci-
dent plans, inspections, and safety training.148 All of these activities, the
DFPD counted as necessary services that must be rendered to keep the
property owners safe and to be an effective fire protection district.149 So
the DFPD contended that it rendered services that directly benefited the
property owners and were necessary for its continuation.
As the dissent noted, the property owners relied on a number of AG
opinions that speak to a fire-protection district's authority to charge fees.5°
And while AG opinions are not binding authority, they can be persua-
sive.151 The dissent cited four of these opinions and found that they laid a
solid framework for interpreting the meaning of "services rendered."'52
The opinions stated that while a fire-protection district can "fix rates ... for
services rendered,' 53 it cannot charge "dues.' 154 Further, the opinions
noted that a fire-protection district can charge for "emergency response
services, or rescue services' 55 and for "services which have already been
rendered,"'156 but not "in anticipation of rendering services.'
' 57
Justice King next addressed the differences between fees and taxes.
He noted the parties' reliance on impact fees in relation to their situa-
tions.158 Two prior Mississippi Supreme Court cases shed light on the dis-
tinction between a tax and a fee: Ocean Springs and Sweet Home. The
former held that a tax consists of "a mandatory payment, it provides reve-
nue to the government, it is exacted for public purposes, and it provides a
benefit to the community as a whole.' 59 Alternatively, "a fee is charged
by an agency to defray its cost of operation, and it confers a special benefit/
service upon the payer."6' After considering these definitions and holding
that the impact fee in dispute was actually a tax, the court warned of the
145. Id.
146. Id.







154. Id. at 61.
155. Andrew Dulaney, Op. Att'y Gen., 2001 WL 1082630 (Miss. Aug. 24, 2001).
156. Charles Marshall, Op. Att'y Gen., 2005 WL 3817032 (Miss. Dec. 27, 2005).
157. Id.
158. Alfonso, 122 So. 3d at 62-63.
159. Id. (citing Mayor & Bd. of Alderman, City of Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders Ass'n of Miss.,
Inc., 932 So. 2d 44, 54 (Miss. 2006)).
160. Id.
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misuse of fees to "evade the Constitutional and Legislative limitations
placed upon governing authorities in regard to taxation.1 6 The latter case
also dealt with impact fees, and the court held that an impact fee cannot be
charged in anticipation of extra expenses.
162
The majority cited two other state court opinions to support its conten-
tion that because the property owners benefited from the DFPD's prepara-
tion to render fire services, the fee is permissible.163 The dissent attempted
to expose the lack of congruence in these other state court opinions to the
case at hand. Particularly, the dissent noted that the Washington opinion
was dealing with a benefit charge, which relied on a state statute that Wash-
ington had in place but Mississippi does not.164 In addition, the dissent
argued that the Wisconsin opinion has nothing to do with fire-protection
fees in general, but rather it was specifically dealing with the storing and
providing of water for fire protection.1 65 Justice King indicated that an-
other Wisconsin opinion has held that their statute only allows a special
charge for "services which are actually performed."166 Thus, it relied on a
"per call calculation."'167
"Services rendered," as defined by the dissent, is limited to "specific
services delivered directly to a specific customer."'68 In other words, when
a fire protection district responds to a house to put out a fire. Anticipatory
services are not to be charged to the property owners in the form of fees.
To do so equates to an illegal tax. In light of these findings, Justice King,
Kitchens, and Chandler disagreed with the majority.1 69
V. ANALYSIS
With the Alfonso holding handed down by the Mississippi Supreme
Court, fees will quickly become ripe fruit for a district's picking. A broad
interpretation of fees is subject to abuse by local governments looking for
easy sources of funding. More than any other, this recent decision high-
lights the need for a consistent, systematic approach to dealing with fees.
The Alfonso decision confused what little delineation there was between
fees and taxes. By holding that anticipatory services can be considered
:'services rendered," the Court provided no standard as to the meaning of
"services rendered." And more importantly, it offered no distinction be-
tween fees and taxes.
161. Mayor & Bd. of Alderman, 932 So. 2d at 56.
162. Sweet Home Water & Sewer Ass'n v. Lexington Estates, Ltd., 613 So. 2d 864, 870 (Miss.
1993).
163. Alfonso, 122 So. 3d at 64.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 64-65.
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The following sections highlight the importance of distinguishing fees
from taxes, the consequences of failing to do so, approaches taken in other
jurisdictions, and possible solutions to Mississippi's current law on the
matter.
A. Importance of Distinguishing Fees from Taxes
The power to tax is the power to destroy.1 70 For that reason, the
power to tax has always been closely guarded by legislators and courts. But
what if evading these limitations is as easy as giving a tax a new name?
171
If so, then a fee can be implemented that raises revenue while bypassing
the restraints of an ordinary tax. Because of this danger, fees and taxes
must be appropriately recognized.
Taxes and fees are mutually exclusive. Taxes are not fees and fees are
not taxes; they do not overlap and should not be categorized together.
17 2
While they are both means of funding governmental entities, their similari-
ties do not extend much further than that. Constitutions and statutes have
restricted taxes much more heavily than fees, and consequently, fees slip
through without notice. For that reason (and others), implementing a new
fee is much less repulsive to the average citizen than implementing a new
tax.
The Constitution of the United States and State constitutions have
granted the power to tax as a means of raising revenue.173 This power rests
with the legislature and is to be guarded jealously. Rules limit the use of
taxes, such as apportionment and uniformity."7 4 And more importantly,
taxes are regulated by public opinion. Public officials and legislators, fear-
ing re-election, are wary of raising or imposing taxes in a way that would
upset the public. The people are the most effective check on their gov-
erning officials. Out of the many topics about which citizens keep in-
formed in the political realm, taxes are always on the forefront. Whether
the state or federal government is imposing new taxes is sure to get a lot of
publicity. Politicians are aware of this and are, thus, more inclined to shy
away from taxes if necessary-especially in a re-election year. This is a
powerful restriction on taxes, but it is relatively nonexistent in the area of
fees.
Fees do not share the same level of popularity. Generally, if fees are
raised in a particular area, little or no media coverage will be devoted to it.
Fees are an easy way for public officials to raise government revenue, while
escaping the public eye.1 75 Assessing fees to fund government projects is
170. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 391 (1819) (stating that "[a] right to tax, without limit or
control, is essentially a power to destroy").
171. See Samis Land Co. v. City of Soap Lake, 23 P.3d 477, 485 (Wash. 2001) (holding that a
charge was really "a tax in fee's clothing").
172. Reynolds, supra note 22, at 408.
173. U.S. CONST. art. l, § 8.
174. Id.
175. Brain Faler, Government Fees the Key to Budget Bargain?, POLITICO, Apr. 3, 2015, http://
www.politico.com/story/2013/09/grand-bargain-government-fees-96581 .html.
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much safer, simply because there is more leniency than with taxes. The
term "fee" carries less baggage than "tax." If some government entity
charges a fee, it is generally presumed that the fee is a fair reflection of a
benefit received. Because fees are generally tied to a particular service, the
public does not wage war against a fee (as it might with a tax). Although
fees are addressed differently in different jurisdictions, fees usually enjoy
more leniency.176 The limitations surrounding fees are much broader and
more open to interpretation, likely because fees are premised on the re-
coupment of a specific cost. They are not to extend beyond recovering the
amount that a public entity has spent to provide a service for a citizen.
Moving closer to home, districts in Mississippi have been given the
power to charge for fees but not to tax.177 The details provided for limiting
those fees are scarce. For example, with fire departments in Mississippi,
the district is able to charge fees for "services rendered.'1 78 But there is
little guidance for calculating those fees-such as how to come to the value
of a fee or what constitutes a fair amount. One reason for the lack of ex-
planation might be that Congress never expected fees to be expanded as
they have. Perhaps Congress assumed that fees would be charged to
recoup the cost of providing a service; thus, the fee would be fixed as the
amount expended by the district to perform a service for an individual. But
calculating a fee for a specific benefit is difficult to quantify when the only
interaction the district has with a person charged is indirect.179 The further
a district gets from providing a direct service, the harder it is to determine a
reasonable fee.
Additionally, valuing "anticipatory services," as opposed to services
that have already been rendered, creates even more difficulty. To truly
govern a district's fees and ensure that they are a reasonable allocation of
its cost, the person or office charged with supervision would be forced to
value services before they occur and without respect to any individual. The
only reasonable way a fire district could come up with an accurate number
would be to calculate their yearly expenses and divide them among the
property owners in the district. But this method strays from the main pur-
pose of a fee-to recoup the cost of a service provided.8 ° The vast major-
ity of fee payers will receive no direct benefit from the fire district;
176. David Pettinari, Michigan's Common Law Distinction Between Taxes and Regulatory Fees,
User Fees and Special Assessments, JOURNAL OF MULTISTATE TAXATION & INCENTIVES, Aug. 2000, at
*25.
177. Miss. CODE ANN. § 19-5-177(e).
178. Miss. CODE ANN. § 19-5-195.
179. Adam Smith, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 43
(Edwin Cannan ed., 5th ed. 2003). Smith proposed that the "real price of every thing ... is the toil and
trouble of acquiring it." He found that though labor is not necessarily used to estimate the value of a
good or service, it does form the foundation for valuing that particular good or service. Id. In applying
Smith's theory to the present hypothetical, the price becomes more distorted where the labor itself is
unclear. Id.
180. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 3 (2014) (stating that "the primary purpose of a fee is to cover the ex-
pense of providing a service").
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likewise, the fire district will spend no resources on the vast majority of the
property owners charged. And any indirect benefit is difficult to quantify.
A more pressing question might be: Who is charged with supervising a
Commissioner's decision to impose $20 per month instead of $15? The
public elects the Board of Supervisors;81 then the Board of Supervisors
appoints the Commissioner.182 The Commissioner is once removed from a
public vote, which significantly diminishes the public check on his powers.
Who carries the shield for the fee-paying citizens, other than the judiciary,
remains unclear. And even then, as seen in Alfonso, the Court will not
investigate the accuracy of the fee's valuation but only render an opinion as
to whether or not the fee was within the district's authority.
B. Consequences of the Majority's Approach
and the Dissent's Approach
The Court's opinion in Alfonso will most assuredly cause a reaction
from districts and local governments. Although a district's future use of
fees is impossible to predict with complete accuracy, broad assumptions
can be made from past behavior. Looking to the way districts have acted in
the past can shed some light on the way that Alfonso will influence their
future behavior.'83 Further, economic principles can help paint an accurate
picture of what to expect.
But it is also important to note that if the Mississippi Supreme Court
were to have ruled the other way, as the dissent pleaded, there would have
been consequences as well. Court decisions are not made in a vacuum.
They influence the actions of society for better or worse. In order to take a
holistic approach to an issue, it is important to note what far-reaching con-
sequences could accompany a single decision.84 The probable conse-
quences of the Alfonso decision, and also the probable consequences of the
dissent's approach, will be examined in this section.
1. Implications of the Alfonso Holding
The Court in Alfonso dodged a bullet. If the DFPD's fee was found to
be a tax, then local governments and districts struggling for revenue would
have been impaired in raising the necessary funding. But what else hap-
pened? Districts and local government were granted a substantial increase
in their powers. If districts had any concerns about how they were going to
raise additional revenue, they now can rest easier. The lack of analysis
181. MIss. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1.
182. Miss. CODE ANN. § 19-5-167.
183. Matt Moore, Taxes vs. Fees: What's the Difference Between Bananas and Driver's Licenses?,
TAX FOUNDATION (Jan. 14, 2014, 9:25 AM), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/taxes-vs-fees-whats-dif-
ference-between-bananas-and-drivers-licenses.
184. Frank Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. Rr'v. 4, 11 (1984).
(arguing that "the Court is bound to send the wrong signals to the economic system unless the Justices
appreciate the consequences of legal rules for future behavior").
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devoted to distinguishing a fee from a tax, coupled with the broad interpre-
tation of what constitutes "anticipatory services," leaves a lot of room for
exploitation.
The abundance of inquiries to the AG on whether a district can charge
fees shows that the DFPD was not unique. Several other districts have
tried to implement similar fees in the past and will continue to do so with
more confidence in the future.'85 Why would a district not make use of
such an easy source of funds? Armed with the Alfonso holding, districts in
need of revenue will turn to mandatory monthly fees. These fees are the
best source of income a district could ask for: steady, reliable, and court
approved.
As previously mentioned, AG Opinions forecast a heavy reliance on
fees to fund government entities. Districts have pressed the AG's office for
clearance to charge fees for different matters through the years.86 Across
the nation, government entities have begun to turn to fees more frequently
as a source of revenue.'87 This trend is not inherently negative, but it does
exhibit a tendency for abuse. If courts or legislators do not respond with an
apt analysis of such fees, abuse will not be stymied, but encouraged.
Economically, the Alfonso holding is problematic for several reasons.
First, the Court has encouraged a district's broad use of fees to raise reve-
nue, which further separates the fee from the service. Second, when a fee
is separated from the services received in exchange, the fee is more difficult
to monitor. Third, the district is shielded from effective supervision that
should govern its use of fees and taxes to fund services.
A broad interpretation of fees will lead to a broad use of fees. Con-
sider the same practice as used in the private market. There is nothing
wrong with a fire department charging monthly fees for a wide variety of
services. In fact, private fire protection companies do this in other regions
of the country.'8 8 This can be effective and reduces the costs of providing
fire services. When the marginal cost for providing an additional service is
low, the company can bundle products together and offer them at a dis-
counted rate, which benefits the company and the customer. But product
bundling is disfavored when there is no competitive influence. If a com-
pany has a monopoly on a market, as is the case with fire protection dis-
tricts, product bundling rarely benefits the customer.1 89 More often, it is
used as a way to mark up higher profit margins while decreasing the
185. See supra note 183.
186. Sylvia Pross, Op. Att'y Gen., 1990 WL 548177 (Miss. Nov. 29, 1990); Phillip Terney, Op.
Att'y Gen., 1998 WL 958140 (Miss. Dec. 11, 1998); Alfred Koenenn, Op. Att'y Gen., 1993 WL 294280
(Miss. July 12, 1993); Larry Norris, Op. Att'y Gen., 2007 WL 1229246 (Miss. Mar. 20, 2007); Randy
Wilburn, Op. Att'y Gen., 2000 WL 1207464 (Miss. July 14, 2000); Charles Marshall, Op. Att'y Gen.,
2005 WL 3817032 (Miss. Dec. 27, 2005).
187. See supra note 183.
188. See John R. Guardiano et. al, Fire Protection Privitization: A Cost-Effective Approach to
Public Safety, RIEASON, Oct. 1, 1992, http://reason.orglnews/showlfire-protection-privatization (last vis-
ited Apr. 3, 2015).
189. See Richard Schmalensee, Commodity Bundling by Single-Product Monopolies, 25 J.L. &
ECON. 67, 68-70 (1982).
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amount of services provided.9 ° Particularly, where the customer-citizen
has no choice as to whether he pays the fee or not, a district is able to
charge much more than actually required to cover its expenses. For exam-
ple, with the DFPD, it can charge $20 per month, even though its actual
expenses per property owner might be only $10 or less. The district does
not have to account for each expense and tie it to the fee charged but is
allowed to throw a blanket charge over all individuals in the area and move
on.
Further, the danger of separating the service provided from the fee
charged is that it impairs the ability of anyone to effectively monitor such a
fee. In the private market, the consumer provides signals to let the supplier
of a service know if its charge is too high or too low.'91 If enough consum-
ers are not willing to pay for a service, then the supplier might reduce the
price.92 If consumers are buying more of the service than the supplier can
provide, the supplier will likely increase the price.'93 On the other hand, in
the public realm where there is a mandatory charge, this feedback is not
provided. For that reason, there are limits placed on taxes and fees to en-
sure that the governmental entity does not abuse its discretion in imple-
menting the tax or fee. Recognizing this aspect is necessary to understand
the statutory limits placed on fees-that they are tied to a specific service.
When fees are allowed to be administered more broadly, the courts make it
extremely difficult for anyone to protect the citizens from abuse.
By shielding a district's use of fees from effective supervision, the gov-
ernmental entity is removed from the watch of its regulators: the people
and their elected representatives. Who is to protect the property owners if
a Commissioner was to abuse the use of fees? The Commissioner is ap-
pointed by the Board of Supervisors, who are elected by the people, but is
this enough to provide incentive to the Commissioner to walk a straight
line? The Board of Supervisors performs many functions; hence, it is hard
to envision the people responding to an unreasonable fire protection
charge by voting a supervisor out of office for that alone. The law is a more
effective vehicle for enforcing a Commissioner's limitations. And that law
is already in place: Mississippi Code section 19-5-177.
2. Possible Implications of the Dissent's Approach
The dissent's approach would face some difficult consequences also.
But the results are potentially more favorable than the alternative. The
main problem with the dissent's approach, to which the majority of the
court in Alfonso alluded, is that it potentially hamstrings a district in its
attempt to raise funds. Most districts and other governmental entities are
hard pressed to find means to fund their programs. A narrow interpreta-
tion of a "fee" would further frustrate those difficulties.
190. See id.
191. Smith, supra note 179, at 79-80.
192. Id. at 82.
193. Id.
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As a result of a court's restraining fees to only those charges that are
tied to a direct service, local governments would most likely be forced to
cut programs. Fire districts would have to cut back on their staffing or
reduce the quality of their equipment, or both. This seems to be the most
influential factor in the Court's decision in Alfonso. Fire protection and
other services normally provided by government entities are vital to the
public welfare. These services must be protected. The public should have
confidence that its fire department is equipped to perform its services ade-
quately. If that confidence is taken away, people will probably move to
another location or take other similar measures, and rightfully so. The
Court in Alfonso was right to take this into consideration, but there may be
other ways to ensure the safety and trust of the public without expanding
the use of fees.
C. Approaches Taken by Other Jurisdictions
Courts in Virginia,'94 California,' 95 Washington,'96 Michigan,' 97 and
other states have already addressed this issue. Examining other jurisdic-
tions shows that there is more than one way to resolve the fee-tax issue.
But it also shows how important the distinction is and that it requires a
consistent approach.
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed a similar issue in Marshall v.
Northern Virginia Transportation Authority. In that case, a statute was
passed that allowed the NVTA to impose "regional taxes or fees.'"198
These "taxes or fees" were mainly used to recoup the cost of issuing vehicle
licenses, vehicle registrations, inspections, and vehicle repairs.'99 The court
considered whether the legislature had the right to delegate such an au-
thority to nonelected officials.2"' In its analysis, the court first determined
whether the charges were a tax or a fee. In doing so, it looked to the "pri-
mary purpose" of the charge: if the primary purpose of the charge was to
raise revenue, it is a tax.01 Consequently, the court determined that the
charge before it was a tax and moved on to whether the authority to tax
could properly be delegated to the NVTA. The court concluded by stating,
"taxes must be imposed only by a majority of the elected representatives of
a legislative body.,
20 2
A similar test was established by the Washington Supreme Court in
Covell v. City of Seattle.2 °3 In that case, the court addressed whether a
194. Marshall v. N. Va. Transp. Auth., 657 S.E.2d 71 (Va. 2008).
195. Bay Area Cellular Tel. Co. v. City of Union City, 162 Cal. App. 4th 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
196. Covell v. City of Seattle, 905 P.2d 324 (Wash. 1995).
197. Gorney v. City of Madison Heights, 535 N.W.2d 263 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
198. Marshall, 657 S.E.2d at 74.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 77.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 79.
203. Covell v. City of Seattle, 905 P.2d 324 (Wash. 1995).
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charge for residential street utility was a regulatory fee or an unconstitu-
tional tax °.2 4 The court found that the charge was an unconstitutional
tax.2°5 The court considered three factors to help distinguish a fee from a
tax:
[W]hether the primary purpose of the county [or city] is to
accomplish desired public benefits which cost money, or
whether the primary purpose is to regulate ..... .If the
primary purpose of the charges is to raise revenue, rather
than to regulate, then the charges are a tax. Conversely, if
the primary purpose is regulatory, "the charges are properly
characterized as 'tools of regulation', rather than taxes."
The second factor is whether the money collected must be
allocated only to the authorized regulatory purpose. The
last inquiry is whether there is a direct relationship between
the fee charged and the service received by those who pay
the fee or between the fee charged and the burden pro-
duced by the fee payer.20 6
In this manner, a regulatory fee was identified, but the same analysis can be
applied to a user fee or any other type of fee.
And Michigan was also quick to make a distinction between taxes and
fees. In 1876, the Michigan Supreme Court decided Jones v. Board of
Water Commissioners of Detroit, which the court created a test for separat-
ing a tax from a fee.207 There, the court developed two main distinguishing
marks of a fee: (1) the amount of the charge reflects the consumption by
the payer; and (2) consumption of the service is voluntary-the payer is not
compelled to use the service.20 8 In applying these factors, the court found
that a water service charge was an unconstitutional tax because the charge
was mandatory and did not reflect the user's consumption of a specific
quantity of water.20 9
The California Court of Appeals utilized another approach in Bay
Area Cellular Telephone Company v. City of Union City.210 Before the
court was a fee charged to all persons using a telephone line within the city
limits. 211 The fees were collected and allocated directly to a fund for pro-
viding an emergency call center.212 In examining the fee, the court there
noticed several distinguishing marks that indicate when a charge is a tax
and not a user fee: (1) "those who paid the Fee received no benefit not
received by those who did not pay," (2) there was "no discrete group that is
204. Id. at 326.
205. Id. at 333.
206. Id. at 327 (internal citations omitted).
207. Jones v. Bd. of Water Comm'rs of Detroit, 34 Mich. 273 (1876).
208. Id. at 275.
209. Id. at 277.
210. Bay Area Cellular Tel. Co. v. City of Union City, 162 Cal. App. 4th 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
211. Id. at 690.
212. Id. at 691.
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specially benefitted by the imposition," and (3) the fee was not based on
the use of a service but rather access to a service.213 All of these points
lead the court to hold the charge to be a special tax, not a fee.214
The three distinguishing marks noted by the court in Bay Area were
also present in Alfonso. Those who paid the monthly fire protection fee
were not benefitted any more than those who did not. Consider an out-of-
state driver passing through the Diamondhead area who is involved in a
serious car accident. The DFPD responds to the call and extricates the
individual from his smashed car. The DFPD has just provided services to
someone who did not pay the fee. Or consider a person from Biloxi who
travels to Diamondhead to play golf and, while on the course, has a heart
attack. EMS arrives and takes him to the hospital. The DFPD, once again,
has provided services to someone regardless of the fee. Furthermore, as-
suming that fire services would not be denied to a property owner who
failed to pay that month's fee, no benefit is gained by paying for the service
that may or may not be used. So paying the fee gives a property owner no
benefit over any other person that does not pay the fee.
The second distinction pointed out in Bay Area was not present in
Alfonso-a discrete group that was benefited: the residents of the
Diamondhead area. The fee in Alfonso, however, was not based on the use
of the service but instead on access to the service. A resident was forced to
pay the fee even if no firemen ever provided him with any direct service.
The DFPD did not send a bill for the work they performed. Rather, they
charged a fee to everyone regardless of the number of fires or emergencies
they experienced that month.
Virginia, Washington, Michigan, and California's tests are all imper-
fect. But they provide a framework by which a fee can be consistently
distinguished from a tax. Mississippi's approach lacks that consistency be-
cause no framework exists to establish exactly what a fee looks like.
D. Solutions for Mississippi
The distinction between fees and taxes can be clarified in Mississippi in
several different ways. The statutory law in place is adequate to protect
consumers and allow for government entities to raise the needed funds. It
will only take a small step for the Legislature to limit the use of fees or a
common law framework to label charges as a fee or tax. As previously
noted, neither solution will be a panacea, but both would go a long way in
recognizing and restricting fees as intended.
Before examining possible solutions, it is important to remember that
several mechanisms are in place for districts to raise revenue. Only one of
these is charging fees. Other mechanisms for raising revenue are collecting
taxes pursuant to the municipality's allocation and issuing bonds.21 5 If a
213. Id. at 695-96.
214. Id. at 696.
215. Miss. CODE ANN. § 19-5-189 (special tax); Miss. CoiF ANN. § 19-5-181 (issuance of bonds).
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strict and narrow interpretation is pursued, it does not strip districts of all
ability to raise revenue. To the contrary, if the Legislature determines that
sources of funding are too limiting, it may act to raise taxes, or a district
may act itself to issue bonds. A strict interpretation of fees serves to limit
only one tool that a district possesses o that it may not be used to gain
more control than that which is provided by the Legislature.
One way to ensure a more narrow reading of Mississippi Code section
19-5-177, the Legislature can amend that section to clarify it meaning. The
majority of the court in Alfonso focused more on breaking down "services
rendered" than on the distinction between fees and taxes. So another rem-
edy could be to define "services rendered" as the AG has opined: direct
services, not anticipatory services. This will tether a district's use of fees
more tightly to a direct service, rather than letting it use broad fees to accu-
mulate general revenues. This solution may be too pointed to have a wide
effect though. It would clear up some confusion for districts that get their
authority from Mississippi Code section 19-5-151, but it would not have
much affect outside of that. Other fees may still continue to face the same
issues. But more importantly, legislation that is direct and to the point
could stem the tide of district fees, which could come quickly after the Al-
fonso decision.
Statutes are more efficient when their terms are defined and the courts
can easily interpret them. If a definition was added to give the phrase "ser-
vices rendered" a clear meaning, the public would stand to benefit. Public
entities would see their limits more clearly and individuals would be aware
of the meaning of the current law. Laws should be transparent and should
give notice to all. Some might argue that the Mississippi Supreme Court
has already accomplished this by handing down the Alfonso decision, and
that is certainly true. My solution would be to alter that definition. "Ser-
vices rendered" should be strictly construed to mean only those direct ser-
vices that a district provides to a specific citizen or group of citizens.
Including anticipatory services and other non-direct services lends itself for
abuse. It provides governmental entities with too much wiggle room when
deciding how to fund their respective programs. For that reason, legisla-
tion is appropriate to properly restrict this behavior.
The Court's decision in Alfonso appears to be the result of the-ends-
justifies-the-means reasoning-where the Court justified a broad definition
of services rendered and a loose interpretation of fees for strong public
policy reasons. But strong public policy should not control the Court's de-
cision. The Mississippi Constitution, in Article 1, Section 2, states that if
one branch of the government is given a certain power, then no other
branch can exercise that same power.216 Because the Legislature has been
given the power to pass laws in accordance with public policy, the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court cannot rewrite a statute simply because it feels there
216. Miss. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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are strong public policy reasons for doing so.217 So the Court has the au-
thority to read a statute broadly without being accused of rewriting a stat-
ute. And a broad reading, rather than a rewriting of the text, could
describe the outcome of the Alfonso holding.
Nevertheless, if a broad reading is to be the favored result, then it is
simply the means that needs adjusting. To provide the term "fee" with a
broad scope, a more developed legal analysis will serve to ensure consis-
tency rather than relying on a case-by-case judgment. Factors, such as the
ones employed by Virginia, Michigan, Washington, and California courts,
can be administered to give effect to a broad interpretation while also giv-
ing courts a proper framework to rightly distinguish between fees and
taxes. But if there is no standard, the results will vary widely from case to
case. For this reason, the Mississippi Supreme Court needs to adopt a stan-
dard and use it in its application to the facts of cases such as Alfonso. The
results need not change, but the process will benefit taxpayers and districts
alike by giving them a specific standard by which they can judge their indi-
vidual fees.
VI. CONCLUSION
As fees become more and more prevalent, the need for a consistent,
analytical approach increases. The Court could have addressed this issue
with Alfonso but chose to decide the case on different merits-namely the
definition of "services rendered." The use of fees post-Alfonso will reveal
to what extent a broad definition of "services rendered" will have on local
governments and districts. Regardless of that impact, Mississippi would
benefit greatly from a fee-tax delineation that has been made by other
jurisdictions.
Drawing a definite line in the sand between fees and taxes will benefit
taxpayers by protecting them from potential abuse of fees. If fees are not
tethered tightly to a specific definition, they can be used to circumvent stat-
utory restrictions that have been placed on governmental entities. To avoid
this, the courts and legislators should establish protections that will restrict
the improper use of fees.
217. Miss. CONST. art. IV, § 88.
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